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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Daniel Dale Parsons, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered upon the
jury verdicts finding him guilty of aiding and abetting robbery, eluding a peace
officer, and being a persistent violator.

For the first time on appeal, Parsons

claims that one of the district court's jury instructions regarding the persistent
violator enhancement was erroneous.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On October 20, 2010, Parsons' wife entered a KeyBank branch in Boise,
Idaho wearing a wig, sunglasses, a black sweater and gloves, and handed the
teller a note that stated, "WE HAVE GUNS! MONEY IN BAG!" (PSI, p.i; Tr.,
p.165, L.18 - p.172, L.2; p.174, Ls.1-13.) The teller put money in the bag and
Parsons' wife exited the bank. (PSI, p.2; Tr., p.172, L.5 - p.173, L.25; p.176,
Ls.9-13.)
Shortly thereafter, police located and began pursuing Parsons and his
wife in a vehicle travelling on 1-84.

(PSI, p.2; Tr., p.227, L.5 - p.233, L.15.)

Parsons accelerated to speeds over 110 miles per hour, drove through a
construction zone, and weaved in and out of traffic during the pursuit.

(PSI,

p.56; Tr., p.233, L.16 - p.238, L.5.) Parsons eventually lost control of the vehicle
and crashed into a storage shed located in the backyard of a residence. (PSI,
p.2; Tr., p.238, Ls.6-22.) Officers at the scene of the crash observed a gun and

1PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"ParsonsPSl.pdf."
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numerous denominations of money on the ground near the vehicle. (PSI, p.57;
Tr., p.322, L.15 - p.323, L.1S; p.377, Ls.4-14.)
The state charged Parsons with aiding and abetting robbery and eluding a
peace officer.

(R., pp.3S-39.)

The state also sought a persistent violator

enhancement based on Parsons' prior felony convictions for unlawful sale of a
controlled substance, conspiracy to commit robbery with the use of a firearm,
and two counts of burglary. (R., pp.1 07 -OS.) A jury convicted Parsons of aiding
and abetting robbery and eluding a peace officer.

(R., pp.217-1S; Tr., p.613,

L.17 - p.614, L.23.) The jury then found that Parsons was a persistent violator.
(R., p.219; Tr., p.637, L.22 - p.63S, L.13.)

The district court sentenced Parsons to fixed life for aiding and abetting
robbery and enhanced Parsons' sentence for eluding a peace officer to fixed life
based on the persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.233-36; Tr., p.663, LS.321; p.664, Ls.14-16.)
consecutively.

The district court ordered the sentences to run

(R., p.234; Tr., p.664, Ls.4-5.)

pp.238-40.)
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Parsons timely appealed.

(R.,

ISSUES
Parsons states the issue on appeal as:
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT
A JURY INSTRUCTION IN A CONFUSING
HAVE MISLED THE JURY INTO BELIEVING
FIND AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE
ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED

ORALLY CHANGED
WAY THAT COULD
THAT IT NEED NOT
BECAUSE IT HAD

(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Parsons failed to demonstrate fundamental error in the jury
instructions?

3

ARGUMENT
Parsons Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The JUry Instruction Setting
Forth The Elements The State Was Required To Prove To Establish That
Parsons Was A Persistent Violator
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Parsons argues that the district court erred by

orally changing one of the jury instructions regarding the persistent violator
enhancement "in a way that made it confusing and could have misled the jury
into believing" that one of Parsons' prior felony convictions "had already been
established and it must accept it."
constitutional in nature.

(Appellant's brief, p.9.)

Parsons claim is

However, Parsons has failed to meet his burden of

demonstrating clear error on the record and he has failed to establish that there
is a reasonable possibility that the alleged error affected the outcome of the trial.
Therefore, Parsons cannot show fundamental error in the district court's
instruction.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88,
261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657,659, 8
P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). "An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible
error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party."
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010)
(citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)). Jury
instructions are reviewed as a whole because "[i]t is well established that [an]
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instruction 'may not be judged in artificial isolation,' but must be considered in the
context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record." Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)).

C.

Parsons Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Establishing Fundamental
Error With Respect To His Claim Of Instructional Error
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
This same principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions.

See I.C.R.

30(b) ("No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction
unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict,
stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the
objection."). Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only
review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Parsons to
demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Application of this three-prong test to
Parsons' claim of instructional error shows that he has failed to demonstrate
fundamental error.
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After Parsons was convicted of aiding and abetting robbery and eluding a
peace officer, the district court informed the jury that the state also charged
Parsons with being a persistent violator and that Parsons "denied the alleged
prior convictions." (R., p.211; Tr., p.616, L.10 - p.617, L.8.) The district court
instructed the jury that "[y]ou must now determine and find whether or not the
allegation of two or more prior convictions is true. For purpose of this finding, the
following additional instructions are given you [sic] which you will consider along
with the pertinent instructions which have heretofore been given to yoU.[2]" (R.,
p.211; Tr., p.617, Ls.11-15.) The district court also instructed the jury that in
order to find that Parsons was a persistent violator, the jury must determine
whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Parsons "has been
convicted on at least two prior occasions of felony offenses." (R., p.212; Tr.,
p.618, L.22 - p.620, L.8.) The written jury instructions provided that:
[Y]ou must next consider whether the defendant has been
convicted on at least two prior occasions of felony offenses.
The state alleges the defendant has prior convictions as
follows:
Count I

That the Defendant, DANIEL D. PARSONS JR, on or about the
24th day of July, 1981, was sentenced after a conviction or guilty
plea for the crime of UNLAWFUL SALE OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, a FELONY, in the County of Washoe, State of
Nevada, by virtue of that certain Judgment of Conviction made and
entered in Case No. C81-303.

2 The district court had previously instructed the jury that "[a]s members of the
jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those facts to the law
that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the evidence
presented in the case." (R., p.195; Tr., p.575, Ls.2-6.)
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and
Count II

That the Defendant, DANIEL D. PARSONS JR, on or about the
22 nd day of May 1987, was sentenced after a conviction or guilty
plea for the crime of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY WITH
THE USE OF A FIREARM, a FELONY, in the County of Washoe,
State of Nevada, by virtue of that certain Judgment of Conviction
made and entered in Case No. C86-1702.
and/or[3]
Count III
That the Defendant, DANIEL D. PARSONS JR, on or about the
22 nd day of May 1987, was sentenced after a conviction or guilty
plea for the crime of BURGLARY, a FELONY, in the County of
Washoe, State of Nevada, by virtue of that certain Judgment of
Conviction made and entered in Case No. C86-1700.
and/or
Count IV

That the Defendant, DANIEL D. PARSONS JR, on or about the
22 nd day of May 1987, was sentenced after a conviction or guilty
plea for the crime of BURGLARY, a FELONY, in the County of
Washoe, State of Nevada, by virtue of that certain Judgment of
Conviction made and entered in Case No. C86-1703.
(R., p.212.) The written instructions further provided that "[t]he existence of a

prior conviction must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and your decision
must be unanimous." (R., p.212.)
The state presented its evidence regarding Parsons' prior felony
convictions (Tr., p.622, L.6 - p.631, L.10), and the district court instructed the

The "and/or" language in this instruction was proposed by the state in order "to
preserve the persistent violator [enhancement] if the jury does find him guilty of
persistent violator given case law to show that he has two underlying or two
previous convictions where there was an intervening period in which he could
have been rehabilitated." (Tr., p.29, Ls.6-24.) Defense counsel did not object to
this jury instruction. (Tr., p.29, Ls.22-23.)
3
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jury, in relevant part, as follows:
Just as the state has the burden of proving all of the
elements of the crime of aiding and abetting robbery and eluding
beyond a reasonable doubt, so the state has the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Daniel D. Parsons,
Junior, has been convicted of at least prior two [sic] felonies by
finding the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt at least
two of the counts alleged in the Information Part II.
Thus in this case if you find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant has been convicted of at least
two of the crimes listed in Part" of the information and that each of
the same two crimes is a felony, then you should find the
defendant is a persistent violator of the law. Should that evidence
fail to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find
the defendant is not a persistent violator.
Now, for the purposes of this instruction, you must find that
Count One has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Tr., p.632, L.21 - p.633, L.24 (emphasis added).)
Parsons did not object to the preceding jury instruction.

However, he

argues on appeal that the district court's oral jury instruction that "for the purpose
of this instruction, you must find that Count One has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt" was erroneous because "this sentence can mean two very
different things." (Appellant's brief, p.g.) Parsons' claim of reversible error is
without merit.
Although Parsons' claim is constitutional in nature, see,

~,

Draper, 151

Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 ("the State must prove every element of the
offense, and a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to that
requirement."), the error that Parsons alleges is not clear on the record. Under
the fundamental error test, Parsons must establish not only that there was an
error, but that there was an error that is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without
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the need for any additional information" including information "as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision." Perry. 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at
978.
Parsons contends that "[w]hile it can be determined from the full record
what has [sic] going on," the district court's jury instruction regarding the
persistent violator enhancement "could have misled the jury" into thinking that
the conviction listed under Count I had already been established. (Appellant's
brief, pp.9, 11 (emphasis added).) However, Parsons' strained interpretation of
the district court's jury instruction does not establish that there was a clear or
obvious error. When the jury instructions are reviewed as a whole and in the
context of the entire trial record, there is no reasonable likelihood that a rational
jury would have applied the challenged instruction in a way that violated Parsons'
constitutional rights.
Based on the circumstances regarding Parsons' prior felony convictions,
the parties and the district court wanted to ensure that the jury did not find that
Parsons was a persistent violator based solely on his three prior felony
convictions that he was sentenced for on May 22, 1987. (Tr., p.566, L.2 - p.568,
L.4; p.637, Ls.5-16.) The district court wanted to make it clear that the state had
to prove the 1981 conviction set forth in Count I beyond a reasonable doubt, as
well as at least one of the 1987 convictions set forth in Counts II-IV, before the
jury could find that Parsons was a persistent violator.

(Tr., p.637, Ls.16-18.)

Accordingly, the district court used an "and/or" format for the 1987 convictions.
(R., p.212; Tr., p.568, Ls.3-4.)
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In addition to the jury instruction setting forth the prior convictions alleged
by the state, the district court instructed the jury that "[y]ou must now determine
and find whether or not the allegation of two or more prior convictions is true."
(R., p.211; Tr., p.617, Ls.8-10.) The district court emphasized the fact that "[j]ust

as the state has the burden of proving all of the elements of the crime of aiding
and abetting robbery and eluding beyond a reasonable doubt, so the state has
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Daniel D.
Parsons, Junior, has been convicted of at least prior two [sic] felonies by finding
the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt at least two of the counts
alleged in the Information Part II." (Tr., p.633, Ls.2-11; R., p.213.)
These instructions, along with the other jury instructions provided by the
district court, make it highly unlikely that any juror would have interpreted the
district court's statement that "for the purposes of this instruction, you must find
that Count One has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt" as a direction that
an element of the persistent violator enhancement had already been established.
Furthermore, any possible ambiguity in the challenged instruction would have
been cured by the other jury instructions regarding the state's burden of proof
and the jury's duty to decide what the facts of the case were.

See State v.

Ranstrom, 94 Idaho 348, 352, 487 P.2d 942, 946 (1971) (holding that any jury
confusion that may have resulted from the challenged jury instruction would have
been "disspelled" by another instruction regarding the state's burden of proving
"every material allegation contained in the Information beyond a reasonable
doubt"); see also State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 574, 165 P.3d 273, 288 (2007)
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(holding that "any confusion" in the challenged jury instruction was "cured" by the
use of other instructions that were given). As such, the instruction given by the
district court did not relieve the state of its burden of proving every element of the
persistent violator enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt
Parsons' speculation that the challenged instruction "could have misled
the jury" is simply unsupported by the trial record.

(Appellant's brief, p.11.)

During the prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor explained her
understanding of the instruction at issue here by stating:
The judge instructed you that you need to find Count One
and what she meant by that - or my reading of what she meant by
that is there's this judgment, which is the second to the last page,
the first page forward from the blue page, which is - the case
number's listed here in the upper left and it's the 1981 conviction.
The remainder of the judgments have their case numbers
also visible up here on the left-hand upper corner and - however,
they are all listed in the text together. And so there's three different
case numbers and three charges; the burglary, the conspiracy to
commit robbery with the use of a firearm and being an ex-felon in
the possession of a firearm.
And so what the instruction is calling on you to do is to
determine that this is in regard to Mr. Parsons and that at least one
of these that are sort of listed here together are also him and that
together he's been convicted twice previously.
Because these are all listed on the same judgment, we ask
you not to find just two of these, but one of these and the one from
the earlier dates because there's more separation in time and it's
more proper under the rules and the laws.
(Tr., p.635, L.1 - p.636, L.2.)
After defense counsel presented his closing argument, the jury left the
courtroom to deliberate and the district court explained the purpose of the
instruction that was given to the jury:
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I want to make it really clear for the record that they had to
find that the first count was, in fact, proven because I think that's
what the intent was of the way in which we've written it. And even
though it's not in the written instructions, the law is very clear that
the oral instructions are actually what control.
I'm not going to rewrite that because I think that the point the point here is we want to make sure that it cannot be later
argued that they didn't find him on the one, they just found him on
these other three. I want to make it clear they have to find the one
before they find the rest of them.
(Tr., p.637, Ls.5-18.)
Parsons attempts to downplay the significance of these comments on the
challenged jury instruction because the "prosecutor's interpretation of what the
court meant cannot substitute for a correct instruction from the court,,,4 and "while
the court made its record about what it was trying to do, it did not do so before
the jury, and so it does not clarify the instruction the jury received." (Appellant's
brief, pp.1 0-11.)

However, these unobjected to statements made by the

prosecutor and the district court are relevant to the determination of how the jury
would have interpreted and applied the challenged instruction. The instruction is
not misleading when it is appropriately read in the context of the other jury
instructions that were given and the trial record. Therefore, Parsons has failed to
demonstrate clear error.
Parsons has also failed to show that the lack of an objection was not

Although it is true that the district court instructed the jury that it must follow the
jury instructions given by the court (R., p.194), U[c]losing argument is an
opportunity for the parties to clarify the issues that must be resolved by the jury;
to review the evidence with the jury and discuss, from the parties' respective
standpoints, the inferences to be drawn therefrom; and to discuss the law set
forth in the jury instructions as it applies to the trial evidence." State v. Beebe,
145 Idaho 570, 576, 181 P.3d 496, 502 (Ct. App. 2007)
4
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intentional.

As stated previously, defense counsel did not object to the jury

instructions regarding the persistent violator enhancement. If defense counsel
thought, as appellate counsel now contends, that the challenged jury instruction
may have eliminated the state's burden of proving every element of the
persistent violator enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt, defense counsel
would have had multiple opportunities to object to the instruction.

However,

there was no objection when the district court gave the instruction and there was
no objection when the district court and the prosecutor commented on the
intended purpose of the jury instruction regarding Parsons' prior felony
convictions. (See Tr., p.633, Ls.22-24; p.635, L.1 - p.636, L.13; p.637, Ls.5-18.)
Accordingly, this failure to object was either a tactical decision designed to allow
Parsons to belatedly raise the issue on appeal if the case did not conclude in his
favor or defense counsel's understanding of the jury instruction was actually
consistent with the statements made by the district court and the prosecutor.
Either way, Parsons has failed to satisfy the second prong of the fundamental
error test.
Parsons has also made no showing that he was prejudiced by the alleged
error. Under the third prong of the fundamental error test, "the defendant must
further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless; i.e., that
there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial."
State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376,378,256 P.3d 784,786 (Ct. App. 2011).
Parsons argues that harmless error does not apply here because "the
instruction does not simply ignore an element that the jury has to find, but rather,
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appears to direct the jury that the element has already been found so rather than
the jury needing to find two prior convictions, it needed only find one more in
addition to the apparently already established conviction."
p.11.)

(Appellant's brief,

More specifically, Parsons argues that the district court's instruction

regarding Count I is "similar to when the court instructs a jury on a stipulation"
and is analogous to a court directing a verdict.

(Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.)

These arguments should be rejected.
"A jury instruction that lightens the prosecution's burden of proof by
omitting an element of the crime, creating a conclusive presumption as to an
element, or shifting to the defendant the burden of persuasion on an essential
element, is impermissible." State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47, 13 P.3d 1256,
1260 (Ct. App. 2000). However, "[a] harmless error analysis may be applied in
cases involving improper instructions on a single element of the offense or even
when a court omits an essential element from the instructions to the jury." State
v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 444, 224 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis
added).
The district court did not direct a verdict on the persistent violator
enhancement. As stated above, the instruction given by the district court did not
relieve the state of its burden of proving every element of the persistent violator
enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, even assuming that the

jury could have somehow interpreted the instruction in the way that Parsons
contends on appeal, the alleged error may still be reviewed for harmless error
because the challenged instruction only relates to a single element of the
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persistent violator enhancement. The alleged error in this case is more akin to
an omitted element or a conclusive presumption regarding an element than a
directed verdict on an entire criminal charge.
"[W]here the jury instructions were only partially erroneous, such as where
the jury instructions improperly omitted one element of a charged offense, the
appellate court may apply the harmless error test, and where the evidence
supporting a finding on the omitted element is overwhelming and uncontroverted,
so that no rational jury could have found that the state failed to prove that
element, the constitutional violation may be deemed harmless."

Draper, 151

Idaho at 591, 261 P.3d at 868 (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at
976).
Application of this standard to the facts of this case shows that the alleged
error in the district court's statement that "for the purposes of this instruction you
must find that Count One has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt" was
harmless.

Although Parsons did not plead guilty to the persistent violator

enhancement, the record shows that Parsons never actually contested the
enhancement. (See Tr., p.618, Ls.12-19; p.631, Ls.4-5; p.632, Ls.16-20; p.636,
Ls.14-17.)

Furthermore, the state presented an overwhelming amount of

evidence clearly establishing that Parsons had been convicted of at least two
prior felonies.
At trial, the state called Detective Pietrzak who testified that he collected
the items contained in State's Exhibit 38A from Part I of the trial and that he took
the photograph of those items that was admitted as State's Exhibit 2 in Part" of
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the trial. (Tr., p.621, L.12 - p.624, L.11.) Those items consisted of an ex-felon
registration card that had Parsons' photograph, name, date of birth, and social
security number on it. 5 (Tr., p.625, L.18 - p.626, L.3; State's Exhibit 2.) The
state also presented Parsons' certified penitentiary packet, which contained
Parsons' name, his date of birth, his social security number, his mug shot, his
Nevada Department of Prisons number, his fingerprint card, and a physical
description of Parsons.

(State's Exhibit 1; Tr., p.626, L.11 - p.629, L.3.)

Parsons' penitentiary packet also contained judgments of conviction for his 1981
felony conviction for unlawful sale of a controlled substance and his 1987 felony
convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery with the use of a firearm and two
counts of burglary. (State's Exhibit 1; Tr., p.629, L.4 - p.631, L.1.) The first page
of the penitentiary packet is a certificate attesting to the packet's authenticity that
was signed by the Nevada Correctional Case Records Manager and the
Secretary of State for Nevada. (State's Exhibit 1.) That certificate states that (1)
"in [the signatory's] legal custody as such officer are the original files and records
of persons heretofore committed to said penal institution;" (2) the attached
documents are "copies of the original records;" (3) that those original records
pertain to "Daniel Dale Parsons #17002;" and (4) that the signatory has
"compared the foregoing and attached copies with their respective originals now
on file in my office and each thereof contains, and is, a full, true and correct copy

Parsons' driver's license and his social security card were both admitted during
Part I of the trial (Tr., p.413, L.24 - p.416, L.18; p.626, Ls.4-10), and his date of
birth and social security number were set forth in Parsons' booking photo, which
was admitted in Part I of the trial (State's Exhibit 69; Tr., 477, Ls.12-25).
5

16

of its said original." (State's Exhibit 1.)
In light of this overwhelming evidence, the error alleged by Parsons was
harmless.

Parsons does not even attempt to explain how a reasonable jury

could conclude that the 1981 conviction set forth by the state in Count I of the
persistent violator enhancement was not proven, while also concluding that at
least two of the 1987 convictions set forth in Count II had been established. The
judgments of convictions for all four of the prior convictions alleged by the state
were contained in the same penitentiary packet and the evidence proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that all of those convictions belonged to Parsons. The only
real difference between the information contained in the penitentiary packet
regarding Parsons prior convictions is that the packet contains an additional
document regarding Parsons' 1981

conviction that shows that Parsons'

probation was revoked in that case. (State's Exhibit 1.)
The evidence presented by the state regarding Parsons' prior convictions
overwhelmingly established that Parsons had two prior felony convictions and
that Parsons was a persistent violator of the law. No rational juror could have
found for Parsons on the question of whether he was a persistent violator based
on the evidence that was presented at trial. Therefore, the alleged instructional
error was harmless and Parsons has failed to demonstrate fundamental error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding that Parsons was a persistent violator.
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